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Introduction
It is a great honour for me to be given an opportunity of 
addressing such distinguished audience on the solemn occasion of 
the inauguration of my honorary professorship at this prestigious 
University of Leiden. I wish to express my deep gratitude to the 
Rector Magnifi cus, Dr. Breimer; to the Dean of the Faculty of Arts, 
Dr. Booij; and to all the others who have contributed so much for 
my appointment to this honourable position.
Just over a year ago, I had the privilege of addressing on the 
commemoration of the 150th anniversary of the creation of the 
University Chair for Japanese Studies at Leiden University. As I 
said in my commemorative speech on that occasion, the 
University chair for Japanese Studies was created at this 
University in 1855 as the fi rst such chair for the academic 
pursuit of Japanese studies in Europe and in the world. And 
this fact is no coincidence. After all, it was the Dutch who 
succeeded in cultivating serious interest in the relations 
between East Asia and Western Europe through their 
wide-ranging activities in East Asia, especially the activities of 
the Dutch East India Company in the 17th and 18th centuries. 
Thanks to this development the Dutch studies (rangaku) in 
the Tokugawa Japan became an important subject of 
intellectual pursuit.
It seems fi tting to this occasion of my appointment as honorary 
professor to recall this fact. It was the Dutch ship, De Liefde 
(Charity), which reached the shores of Japan on 19 April 1600, 
that marked the initiation of offi cial contacts between Japan and 
Holland. Jan Joosten Lodensteijn, a member of the crew and 
scion of a prominent Delft family, later served the Shogun as his 
adviser on foreign affairs. This effectively opened the way for the 
subsequent development of special relations that the Dutch 
came to enjoy for the next 250 years with Japan. Rangaku started 
to fl ourish in spite of the offi cial policy of the Shogunate since 
1639 to close the country to the outside world (sakoku). Scholars 
such as Aoki Konyo (1698-1769), Maeno Ryotaku (1723-1803), 
Sugita Genpaku (1733-1817) and Otsuki Gentaku (1757-1827) were 
the pioneers of the Dutch studies in this new development on 
the Japanese side.
Today, however, I do not propose to trace the history of this 
remarkable development in the “Dutch studies” in Japan 
during the Tokugawa period. My intention in this inaugural 
lecture is to build upon the theme I tried to present in my 
speech last year, and further to develop my refl ection on the 
civilizational signifi cance of Japan’s encounter with the 
international community, which in those days was called “the 
Community of Civilized Nations”, in the context of historical 
evolution of international law in Europe. I have chosen this 
subject, fi rst of all because I believe that the history of the 
encounter of Japan with this “Community of Civilized 
Nations”, and her reception of the concept of the “Law of 
Nations” as the code of her conduct in this community, forms 
a fascinating intellectual history. Its signifi cance to my mind 
goes further, however. Not only does it offer an interesting 
sidelight to the history of Japan of the period for those who are 
engaged in Japanese studies; it also provides a rich material for 
refl ection for those who are engaged in the study of the 
fundamental character of international law.
Japan was brought into the community of nations as its new 
member just over one hundred and odd years ago, in very 
much the same way as the newly born States of today have 
been in recent years. She, however, in contrast to her brethren 
in more recent years, appears to have followed a course widely 
different from the one that the new members of today would 
appear to have been pursuing. Japan’s performance is seen, by 
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and large, to be what might have been expected of a good pupil 
eager to follow, without questioning, the teaching of his 
mentor. This picture seems to make a marked contrast with 
what has taken place in the post World War II era, where many 
newly independent States of Asia and Africa very often 
questioned the applicability, or even the validity, of what they 
perceived as the “Western international law”. Is this picture of 
Japan accurate? If it is accurate, why has it been so with Japan? 
Or is this picture of Japan more apparent than real? If that is 
the case, what is the real picture? An attempt to answer these 
questions requires an insight into the ramifi cations of history 
surrounding Japan at the time of her admission into the 
international community in the second half of the 19th 
century, as well as an analysis of the perception of Europe 
in those days about the “Community of Civilized Nations”, 
a concept which provided the theoretical basis for the 
applicability of the “law of nations” to states lying outside the 
geographical/cultural scope of Europe.
I do not claim to be able to give a complete answer to these 
questions in this short presentation. What I modestly hope to 
attempt here is to share with you some aspects of this 
experience of Japan and to refl ect upon their possible relevance 
to one of the fundamental issues of contemporary 
international law - the issue of “universal applicability” of 
international law as the law of the international community.
The Concept of the “Community of Nations” 
in the 19th Century
In the modern history of Europe, it used to be customary for 
many years to perceive international law as the “law of 
European nations”.
It may not be possible to trace with accuracy the precise 
genesis of this perception back to its original source, but it 
would seem less diffi cult to identify some elements in the 
evolution of the concept that led scholars to this perception of 
the law of nations. It essentially emanates from the idea that 
the “law of nations is a product of the cultural life and the legal 
conscience of the nations of European civilization”.
1
In my view, there seem to lie behind this assertion two 
intertwined elements that fostered such perception. One is the 
conception of the law, developed theoretically as a doctrine 
born in the tradition of Christian theology, represented by 
such names as Francisco de Vitoria, Suarez and especially Hugo 
Grotius, which was rooted in the concept of the jus naturale of 
Christian origin. The other is the concept of the law, developed 
historically as a doctrine nurtured in the expansionist milieu of 
the 19th century Europe, which was founded on the notion of 
the “community of European nations sharing a common 
civilization” of Judo-Christian faith.
An illustration of the fi rst element can be found already in the 
doctrine developed by Francisco Vitoria (1480-1546). Earlier, 
Pope Innocent IV (1243-1254), who is described as “the greatest 
lawyer that ever sat upon the chair of St. Peter”
2
 because of the 
infl uence he had on his jurisprudential successors like 
Francisco de Vitoria and Hugo Grotius,
3
 claimed that the Pope, 
as the vicar of Jesus Christ, “can grant indulgences to those 
who invade the Holy Land for the purpose of recapturing it 
although the Saracens possess it . . . [for] they possess it 
illegally”.
4
 While inheriting this legacy of Christian theology, 
the Spanish theologian, Francisco de Vitoria, tried to theorize 
the Spanish conquest of the Americas against the alleged rights 
of the inhabitants of the New World on a broader basis of 
natural law.
5
 He tried to justify the Spanish action by taking the 
position that “the issue was less one of faith and more one of 
protecting certain natural rights [of the Spaniards]”.
6
 However, 
Vitoria’s acceptance of the “natural rights” of the Amerindians 
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is to be regarded as being based not only on “Europe’s concern 
to defi ne the rights of all with whom it came into contact in 
legal terms” but also on “its unchanging demand that the basic 
elements of what later became known as a standard of 
‘civilization’ be enforced”.
7
 In this sense, I submit that Vitoria is 
to be regarded as a forerunner of the protagonist for natural 
rights within the legacy of Christian Europe.
Hugo Grotius, who is universally regarded as the “Father of the 
Law of Nations” for his contribution to the construction of the 
modern law of nations, based on the law of nature through his 
systematic treatment of the law of war, also observes the 
following in his chef d’oeuvre, De Jure Belli ac Pacis:
“In two ways men are wont to prove that something is according 
to the law of nature . . . Proof a priori consists in demonstrating 
the necessary agreement or disagreement, of anything with a 
rational and social nature . . . Proof a posteriori, in concluding, if 
not with absolute assurance, at least with every probability, that 
that is according to the law of nature which is believed to be such 
among all nations, or among all those that are more advanced in 
civilization . . .”.
8
Then he continues:
“Not without reason did I of speak of the nations ‘more 
advanced in civilization’; for as Porphyry rightly observes, 
‘some nations have become savage and inhuman and from 
them it is by no means necessary that a fair judges draw a 
conclusion unfavourable to human nature’”.
9
It is my submission that in these teachings of the classical 
school of international law one can discern a seed of the 
process in which the fi rst element of the doctrine of 
jus naturale in the context of Christian theology would develop 
into a theorization of a doctrine which led to the second 
element of the Eurocentric view of the international 
community at the time of an expansionist Europe. I suggest 
that a link between the two in this context is already visible in 
Montesquieu, the philosopher of the Enlightenment, when he 
wrote in his “De l’Esprit des Lois” (1748) the following on the 
law of nations: 
“All nations have the law of nations; and even the Iroquois, who 
eat their prisoners, have one. They send and receive embassies; 
they know the laws of war and peace: the trouble is that their law 
of nations is not founded on true principles.”
10
Interestingly, it is he also who found a distinction between the 
“savage” and the “barbarian”, as the following passage 
demonstrates: 
“One difference between savage peoples and barbarian peoples 
is that the former are small scattered nations, which, for certain 
particular reasons, cannot unite, whereas barbarians are 
ordinarily small nations that can unite together . . . Many 
things govern men: climate, religion, laws, the maxims of the 
government, examples of past things, mores, and manners; a 
general spirit is formed as a result. To the extent that, in each 
nation, one of these causes acts more forcefully, the others 
yield to it. Nature and climate almost alone dominate savages; 
manners govern the Chinese; laws tyrannize Japan . . .”.
11
It would be permissible to suggest that from this position of 
Montesquieu on the distinction between the savage and the 
barbarian as distinguished from the civilized, it was only one 
small step to reach the thesis advanced by James Lorimer, a 
well-known authority of international law of the 19th century. 
He made the famous distinction between “civilized humanity”, 
“barbarous humanity” and “savage humanity” and questioned 
the applicability of the “law of nations” to the different groups 
according to this distinction.
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He opined as follows: 
“As a political phenomenon, humanity, in its present condition, 
divides itself into three concentric zones or spheres - that of 
civilized humanity, that of barbarous humanity and that of 
savage humanity. To these . . . belong, of right, at the hands of 
civilized nations, three stages of recognition - plenary political 
recognition, partial political recognition, and natural or mere 
human recognition . . . The sphere of plenary political 
recognition extends to all the existing States of Europe, with 
their colonial dependencies, in so far as these are peopled by 
persons of European birth or descent; and to the States of North 
and South America which have vindicated their independence of 
the European States of which they were colonies. 
The sphere of partial recognition extends to Turkey in Europe 
and in Asia, and to the old historical States of Asia which have 
not become European dependencies - viz. to Persia and the 
other separate States of Central Asia, to China, Siam, and Japan. 
The sphere of natural, or mere human recognition, extends to 
the residue of mankind; though here we ought, perhaps, to 
distinguish between the progressive and non-progressive races. 
It is with the fi rst of these spheres alone that the international 
jurist has directly to deal . . . He is not bound to apply the 
positive laws of nations to savages, or even to barbarians, as 
such; but he is bound to ascertain the points at which, and the 
direction in which, barbarians or savages come within the 
scope of partial recognition.”
12
When examined in this way, it becomes clear that the history 
of the European perception on the law of nations contains a 
continuum in thinking from the concept of the law of nations 
based on the law of nature as theorized by Vitoria and Grotius 
to the ideology of the law of nations as “the law of European 
civilized nations” as advanced by Lorimer. This ideology served 
the purpose of providing a theoretical basis for the call of the 
“civilizing mission” of Europe (e.g. “la mission civilizatrice” 
advocated by Victor Hugo for France) as a justifi cation for the 
expansion of Europe to Asia and Africa especially of the 19th 
century, and became particularly conspicuous in the writings 
of theorists of international law of the period.
In the same vein, Henry Wheaton, well-known publicist of 
international law of the period, based his theory of 
international law on the idea that international law was 
founded on the principles of Christian morality, as reciprocally 
practised between the Christian States of Europe. He put 
forward this perception in the following thesis: 
“progress of civilization, founded on Christianity, has 
gradually conducted us to observe a law analogous to this in 
our intercourse with all the nations of the globe, whatever may 
be their religious faith, and without reciprocity on their part”.
13
In Wheaton’s view, in other words, “public [international] law, 
with slight exceptions, has always been, and still is, limited to 
the civilized and Christian people of Europe or to those of 
European origin”.
14
It is important to note, however, that this perception of 
“common European civilization” at the basis of the law of 
nations contained an element of practical implication for the 
future application of the system to a broader world. While the 
law of nations was limited to the “civilized Christian people of 
Europe”, it was recognized that there could be a necessity to 
regulate the intercourse between the Europeans and the people 
outside European civilization, as they came in contact with 
each other. This indeed was the theoretical basis for the 
“system of extraterritoriality” that came to be practiced by 
European nations in their dealing with nations outside the 
orbit of European civilization.
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By comparison, John Westlake, Whewell Professor of 
International Law at Cambridge in the second half of the 
19th century, while sharing this predominant view of the 
period that full recognition before international law and 
membership in civilized international society had to be limited 
to the society of states having European civilization, made the 
following point: “Throughout Europe and America, if we 
except Turkey, habits, occupations and ideas are very 
similar . . . The same arts and sciences are taught and pursued, 
the same avocations and interests are protected by similar laws, 
civil and criminal, the administration of which is directed by a 
similar sense of justice . . .
[In contrast] Turkey, Persia, China and Japan, Siam and some 
other countries have civilizations differing from the 
European . . . The Europeans or Americans in them form class 
apart, and would not feel safe under the local administration of 
justice, which, even when they assured of its integrity, could not 
have the machinery necessary for giving adequate protection to 
the unfamiliar interests arising out of a foreign civilization.”
15
In saying this, Westlake makes it clear that “we have nothing 
here to do with the mental or moral characters which 
distinguish the civilized from the uncivilized individual, nor 
even with the domestic or social habits”.
16
 For him, what was at 
stake in this context was the question of “the prime necessity 
[of] a government under the protection of which [Europeans] 
[might] carry on the complex life to which they [had] been 
accustomed in their homes”.
17
 And it was this test that Japan 
would come to face in the crucial years of the second half of 
the 19th century, when the fateful encounter with this 
“Community of Civilized Nations” fell upon Japan.
The Encounter of Japan with the “Community of 
Civilized Nations”
It should not be assumed that Tokugawa Japan during the 
period of sakoku was completely cut off from the movements of 
the outside world. Through the restricted contacts with the 
Dutch at Nagasaki, the advanced knowledge of the West did fl ow 
into Japan. Nevertheless, these contacts were almost exclusively 
limited to the fi elds of science and technology, such as medicine, 
natural science and weaponry, and did not extend to the fi elds 
relating to social and cultural life of the people, such as 
humanities or law. Also, contacts were restricted to purely 
commercial trade, and therefore did not develop into any offi cial 
relationship between the Japanese authorities and the Dutch 
authorities. Dutch traders in Japan, confi ned to the tiny island of 
Deshima in the port of Nagasaki, were subjected to strict 
regulations of conduct imposed upon them by the Japanese 
authorities, and no question was raised about their treatment as 
aliens in the light of the standard of treatment commonly 
practised by the European nations in their mutual intercourse.
By contrast, after some futile attempts by various maritime 
powers to open Japan to the intercourse with nations of the 
world
18
, when Commodore Matthew Perry of the United States 
arrived in Japan in 1853 with four “Black Ships” to present 
President Fillmore’s letter to the Japanese “Emperor”, his 
interest, in spite of what was stated in the President’s letter, was 
as much political as economic.
19
Perry’s basic position in carrying out his instructions was “to 
demand as a right, and not solicit as a favour, those acts of 
courtesy which are due from one civilized nation to another”, 
“to be received in a manner honourable to [his] Government”, 
and “to be treated on a footing of equality, thus destroying the 
presumed claim hitherto held forth by China and Japan, that 
all presents to the respective emperors have been tendered as 
The encounter of Japan with the community of civilized nations
9
tribute to superior powers”. Thus, the fi rst exposure of Japan to 
the “Community of Civilized Nations”, and together with it to 
the totally alien concept of “law of nations” came into being.
When Commodore Perry anchored off the shores of Uraga, 
only a few miles away from Edo, the capital of the Shogunate, 
his demarche triggered a heated reaction in Tokugawa Japan, 
dividing the camps of daimyo (feudal lords) between those 
who advocated for the policy of j ? i (expelling the barbarians) 
and those in favour of kaikoku (opening the country). 
Paradoxically, however, this confi guration of alliances was in 
reality as much based on political manoeuvres as on 
ideological differences, against the background of the declining 
power of the Shogunate and the strategic consideration of 
gaining support among the daimyo in the ensuing battle for 
the succession of power. To prove this point, what started as a 
movement for sonno-j ? i (revering the Emperor cum expelling 
barbarians) against sabaku-kaikoku (supporting the Shogunate 
cum opening the country) ended up by turning into a 
movement for bringing down the Shogunate under the banner 
of sonno-kaikoku (revering the Emperor cum opening the 
country). In fact, apart from a series of xenophobic incidents 
provoked by nationalistic extremists, the whole country came 
to be eventually consolidated in support of the policy for 
opening the country, while rejecting the century-old ancestral 
precept of the Tokugawa Shogunate to keep the country 
immune from the evil infl uences of the outside world - a 
policy which originated in 1639.
It was in fact the defeat of China in the Opium War (1840-1842) 
which forced China to open fi ve ports, including Shanghai, to 
Western powers that alarmed the people in Japan. Nevertheless, 
when the news of this defeat was brought to the offi cials of the 
Shogunate by the Dutch, the reaction of the Shogunate was 
one of indecision. King Willem II delivered a State Note to the 
Shogun on 15 February 1844, in which the King advised that 
 “if your happy land is to be spared of devastation of the war, 
laws strictly forbidding foreigners [to enter into intercourse] 
should be relaxed”, but the reply of the Shogunate was that 
they did not intend to change their “ancient law handed down 
over the generations”.
Small wonder, therefore, that the arrival of Commodore Perry 
at Uraga created a big commotion not only within the 
Government but throughout the country.
Tokugawa Nariaki (1800-1860), former Lord of Mito (one of 
the three families closest in blood to the Shogun) and a fervent 
advocate of the j ? i faction, sent a letter of urgent warning to 
Bakufu (14 August 1853), arguing that “the fi nal and most 
urgent of our tasks is for the Bakufu to make its choice 
between peace and war, and having determined its policy, to 
pursue it unwaveringly thereafter” and he urged that the 
Shogun choose the latter course of action - war to expel the 
Western barbarians.
He advised in effect as follows:
“[If] we put our trust in peace, even though things may seem 
tranquil for a time, the morale of the country will be greatly 
lowered and we will come in the end to complete collapse. This 
has been amply demonstrated in the history of China . . .
Though Rangaku-sha (scholars of Dutch studies in Japan) may 
argue secretly that world conditions are much changed from 
what they were . . . [and that] our best course would be to 
communicate with foreign countries and open an extensive 
trade, yet to my mind if the people of Japan stand fi rmly 
united, if we complete our military preparations and return to 
the state of society that existed before the middle ages, then we 
will even be able to go out against foreign countries and spread 
abroad our fame and prestige . . .”.
10
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Against this emotional outburst of nationalistic sentiments on 
the part of the sonno-j ? i faction, some leaders within the 
Shogunate, including the Tairo (Prime Minister) of the 
Shogunate Government, Ii Naosuke, were much more sober in 
their assessment of the international situation surrounding 
Japan, as described in the State Note of King Willem II. Thus 
Ii Naosuke stated to the Shogun (1 October 1853) as follows: 
“Careful consideration of conditions [of the outside world] 
as they are today leads me to believe that despite the constant 
differences and debates into which men of patriotism and 
foresight have been led in recent years by their perception of 
the danger of foreign aggression, it is impossible in the crisis 
we now face to ensure the safety and tranquillity of our 
country merely by an insistence on the seclusion laws as we did 
in former times . . . There is a saying that when one is besieged 
in a castle, to raise the drawbridge is to imprison oneself and 
make it impossible to hold out indefi nitely; and again that 
when opposing forces face each other across a river, victory is 
obtained by those who cross the river and attack . . . Even 
though the Shogun’s ancestors set up seclusion laws, they left 
the Dutch and the Chinese to act as a bridge [to the outside 
world]. Might not this bridge now be of advantage to us in 
handling foreign affairs, providing us with the means whereby 
we may for a time avert the outbreak of hostilities and then, 
after some time has elapsed, gain a complete victory?”
Eventually this view prevailed, though at the cost of the life 
of Ii Naosuke, who was assassinated. In 1854, the Treaty of 
Peace and Amity with the United States was concluded by 
the Shogunate Government, thus putting an end to the 
250 year history of self-imposed seclusion of Japan from 
the outside world.
While Perry, a soldier, forced Japan to open its door to the 
outside world with a show of arms, it was Harris, the fi rst 
Consul-General in Japan, who gave “in-fi eld instructions” to 
the Japanese authorities on the “law of nations” in the course 
of the ensuing negotiations for the conclusion of a more 
full-fl edged treaty - the Treaty of Amity and Commerce of 1858 
with the Commissioners of the Shogunate.
Again and again Harris invoked the “law of nations” in his 
dealings with Japanese offi cials. In his own diary, he records 
the following: 
“I [added] that the proposition to shut out the Minister [i.e., the 
head of the diplomatic mission] from residing at Edo [i.e., the site 
of the Shogunate], or wherever he pleased, was highly 
offensive . . . and that the Minister and the Consuls must have all 
the rights enjoyed by such person under the laws of nations; that I 
asked nothing more for them than those rights, and that I could 
not take any less.”
20
 (Italics supplied.)
According to his diary, he pursued this point further as follows: 
“I told [the Commissioners] that it was useless to proceed with 
the further consideration of the Treaty until they would consent 
to grant the Minister the rights he enjoyed under the laws of 
nations.”
21
 (Italics supplied.)
This fi rst encounter with the new concept of the law of nations 
was a great surprise to the Bakufu authorities. The concept was 
totally alien and novel to them. They were told that the whole 
concept of the law of nations was the essential prerequisite for 
a satisfactory conduct of intercourse with these barbarian 
Westerners. The outside world consisted of a number of 
nations like Japan, so it was said, but they were organized to 
form a “community of civilized nations” where certain basic 
rules of conduct would apply. The community of nations 
could accept only those nations which were civilized enough 
and prepared to practice this code of conduct in their mutual 
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intercourse. Thus told, they decided that the study and 
understanding of this “law of nations” was a matter of 
immediate urgency for Japan.
As the Japanese looked for a clue to their understanding of this 
alien concept of the law of nations, they found a Chinese 
translation of Wheaton’s book, Elements of International Law, 
which had just been published in China in 1864. The 
translation was made by the Reverend W.A.P. Martin, an 
American missionary, assisted by a commission of Chinese 
scholars appointed by Prince Kung, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs.
22
 Intellectual élites of the day, eager to gain access to 
this new concept of the law of nations, thus devoured the book 
in its Chinese translation.
23
This attitude of the Japanese authorities would appear to make 
a remarkable contrast with the attitude of the Chinese 
authorities during the same period. China fi rst became aware 
of international law already during the early years of the Ch’ing 
dynasty (1644-1912). Representatives of the Dutch East India 
Company had met with the Chinese offi cials between 1662 and 
1690 and frequently referred to the “law of all nations” and “the 
custom of all princes” in the context of their discussion on 
such principles as the immunity of envoys from detention or 
arrest.
24
 It is also a historical fact that the Ch’ing dynasty China 
negotiated with the Czarist Russia to conclude China’s fi rst 
treaty with a Western power - the Treaty of Nerchinsk - in 1689 
to settle the border issue between the two States.
25
Nevertheless, in spite of the pressure exerted by some Western 
powers on China to abandon her isolation and to establish 
political and commercial intercourse on the basis of sovereign 
equality, China continued to insist on her position that 
Western emissaries conform to the Chinese protocol based on 
the tributary system. As one scholar put it, “it was diffi cult for 
the conservative Chinese élite to understand and accept ideas 
completely alien to the traditional East Asian system of 
conducting foreign relations”.
26
What I wish to emphasize with this process is that these 
Japanese offi cials paid particular attention to the problem of 
the nature and sources of international law. In their desperate 
struggle to grasp this novel concept of the law of nations, these 
offi cials tried to understand the whole concept within the 
context of their Confucian culture. Upon the strength of their 
familiarity with the philosophy of neo-classical Zhu Zi school 
of Confucianism, they eventually came up with the idea that 
the concept of the law of nations, defi ned as a canon of rules 
governing the relations between States, must be somewhat 
analogous to their own Confucian metaphysical concept of 
the “principles of the universe” (tendo), which were the basic 
principles governing the human relations in society. Thus, 
these Japanese offi cials came to the conclusion that the 
Western concept of the law of nations must consist of some 
high moral precepts of universal justice applicable to the 
intercourse among States in very much the same way as the 
high moral principles of Confucian tendo were applicable to 
the human relations between individuals in society. Thus they 
came to refer to this concept of the law of nations as “kodo” 
(public principles), which was reminiscent of the Confucian 
principles of “tendo”, i.e., principles of the universe.
27
It is my submission that what is important with this 
development for our purposes today is not so much the point 
that Harris insisted on invoking the “law of nations” in his 
negotiations, as the point that it marked the beginning of the 
process in which the Japanese authorities came to absorb the 
precepts of this law of nations as the universal principle of 
justice applicable to the East as well as to the West, which would 
make it possible for Japan to accept the precepts of this 
12
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“community of civilized nations”. It is also to be noted that it 
marked the beginning of the process in which the West, as 
represented initially by the United States but followed 
immediately by major European powers such as Great Britain, 
France, Russia, and the Netherlands, came to accept Japan as a 
member of this essentially European régime of the “Community 
of Civilized Nations”. Treaties similar to the Harris Treaty of 1858 
were concluded with these powers in the same year.
As soon as the Imperial Government of the Emperor was 
established following the return of political power by the 
Shogunate to the Emperor in Kyoto at the beginning of 1868, 
the new Imperial Government immediately issued various 
proclamations and decrees, in which the Government made its 
fi rm commitment to the “law of nations”. Already on 8 February 
of the same year, the Imperial Proclamation on Foreign Policy 
was issued, in which we fi nd the following declaration: 
“Our foreign intercourse shall be conducted henceforth in 
conformity with the public law of the universe (udai no koho)”.
Only two months later, on 6 April 1868, Emperor Meiji issued 
the “Five Articles of Oath” (the “Charter Oath”) as the basic 
policy pledge of the new Government to the nation. Its fourth 
article declared the following: 
“The evil customs of the past shall be broken off and 
everything henceforth shall be based upon the ‘public 
principles of the universe’ (tenchi no kodo)”.
Thus the new Meiji Government, which took over the power 
from the Shogunate and set on the course of modernization, 
thought it appropriate to invoke the “public law of nations” or 
the “principles of the universe” as the guiding principle of the 
Government and appealed to the Japanese public at large to 
abide by this precept.
It was only natural under these circumstances that a vast 
majority of intellectuals of the day viewed the “law of nations” 
as being synonymous with the European civilization operating 
on the principles that governed the “Community of Civilized 
Nations”. What is most signifi cant in this respect is that they 
based their understanding of this concept on the premise that 
it related to some universal principles of justice which ran in 
common through both the Occidental system and the Oriental 
system. The law of nations was accepted by them on this 
metaphysical level, with its natural law aspect as its 
predominant feature and with their understanding that it was 
synonymous with the neo-classical Confucian concept of the 
principle of heaven.
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In fact, some of these intellectuals even took the more utopian 
view of this concept and regarded the law of nations as nothing 
else than an embodiment of natural justice and reason. For 
them, therefore the law of nations should be the instrument to 
serve as the shield of the weak and the sword for equality; it 
would protect a nascent, weak Japan from the hands of strong 
Western nations. Thus, there was a virtual consensus among the 
leading élites of the country that the law of nations was the 
essential ticket for the admission of Japan into the “Community 
of Civilized Nations” consisting of the European Powers.
On a superfi cial level, what came to be known as the 
“Rekumeikan period” was a manifestation of this trend of the 
time. Rekumeikan is the name of a social club created by the 
Meiji Government for leading élites of society as a place for 
emulating everything European, including western clothing, 
western culture, and western life-style such as social dancing. 
However, much more diffi cult was the creation of social and 
juridical institutions.
As Westlake incisively suggested, however, the opening of the 
country to foreign nations did not make Japan automatically 
acceptable as an equal member of this community. Indeed, 
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precisely for this reason a series of treaties, concluded in the 
early stage of the opening of the country starting in the Ansei 
period (1854-1859) by the Shogunate with a number of Western 
Powers (the Ansei Treaties), contained stipulations for the 
régime of extraterritoriality which reserved the treatment of 
foreign residents in Japan to the consular jurisdiction of the 
Treaty Powers. In their eyes, Japan at that time still belonged to 
the group of nations where “the Europeans [did] not feel safe 
under the local administration of Justice”.
Against this background, the most urgent policy objective of 
the Meiji Government was to get rid of the inequalities 
contained in these “Ansei Treaties”, in particular the régime of 
extraterritoriality. The Treaty Powers on their part, however, 
demanded as the prerequisite for such revision of these treaties 
the modernization of the legal system of Japan in line with 
those of the European countries. In this situation, the new 
Government had to grapple with the problem of transforming 
social and political organization of the country on the basis of 
principles of the modern state system of the European nations 
which constituted the “Community of Civilized Nations”. This 
called for the restructuring of the legal system. The urgency 
required did not allow Japan to wait for the law to grow 
spontaneously in response to the needs as they would arise 
through the transformation of old Japan into a modern 
society. Under these circumstances the Government resorted to 
an extreme step of introducing the legislation of France based 
on the Napoleonic codes, regarded as the most modern in 
Europe at that time, as the model for the Japanese legal system.
At the centre of this exercise for drafting the civil code were 
such people as Mitsukuri Rinsho (1846-1897), who had pursued 
the Dutch studies, which in those days were considered to be 
most important for the study of European culture. The draft 
civil code consisting of 1,820 articles was completed in 1878. 
While it was not adopted in the form it was originally 
proposed as it was thought to be too much a reproduction 
of the French Civil Code, it came to constitute the essential 
framework for the new legal system of Japan.
The Experience in the Revision of Unequal 
Treaties and Its Aftermath
At the same time as the new Imperial Government proclaimed 
its commitment to the continued obligations under those 
treaties upon its assumption of power in 1868, it also took steps 
immediately to notify the representatives of the Treaty Powers 
as early as the beginning of 1869 of its desire to revise certain 
treaty provisions.
In fact, when the Meiji Government initiated a preparatory 
study of the problem, the Government came to realize the 
essentially “unequal” character of the treaties, in particular, 
in relation to three major issues - (a) the régime of 
extraterritoriality of jurisdiction (b) the unilateral nature of 
the conventional tariffs and (c) the unilateral unconditional 
character of the most-favoured-nation clause. All of these were 
perceived to place Japan on an unequal footing with the 
Western contracting parties to the treaties concerned and to 
constitute an infringement of the sovereignty of Japan.
However, the Meiji leaders soon had to realize that the road 
was by no means an easy one. For this purpose, an offi cial 
mission of the Japanese Government led by Iwakura Tomomi 
was sent to the Treaty Powers in 1871 to put forward the views 
and demands of the Government with respect to the proposed 
revision of the treaties. Nonetheless, the attitude of the Treaty 
Powers to the Iwakura Embassy turned out to be a 
disappointing one. And it was the disheartening experience of 
this mission that dealt a hard blow to the confi dence the 
Japanese side had in the justice of the “law of nations.”
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By far the most shattering experience of this mission came 
when the Iwakura Embassy visited Prussia and met Chancellor 
Otto von Bismarck. He had this to say to the mission:
“In today’s world, it is said that every country interacts with 
other States on the basis of friendship, harmony, and courtesy 
(reigi). However, this is merely a superfi cial lip service, behind 
which lies actual practice, that is, insults to which the strong 
subject the weak, and scorn in which the big hold the small. 
When I was a child, my Prussia was poor and weak… 
[I perceived that] the so-called law of all nations argued for 
the profi t of great powers. If the law of nations contained in it 
an advantage for them, the powerful would apply the law of 
nations to the letter, but when it lacked attraction, the law of 
nations was jettisoned, and a military might employed, 
regardless of the tactics.”
By the time Iwakura Tomomi returned from his mission to the 
West in September 1879, he himself was a different person from 
the one who, as a senior member of the new Imperial Cabinet 
of Emperor Meiji, had made the recommendation in 1869 to 
the Cabinet that “Japan should base her intercourse with 
Western countries on reason and justice and good faith”. What 
had been the minority view on the law of nations as being the 
tool of the strong was to become the majority opinion within 
the members of the mission.
The most debilitating experience that would have a long lasting 
effect, however, came with the Japanese House Tax case - an 
arbitration case which Japan herself brought before the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration in 1903.
The positive stance of Meiji Japan towards embracing the law 
of nations had been manifested in her forthcoming positive 
attitude towards international arbitration. Starting with the 
Maria Luz case of 1873, in which the Meiji Government had for 
the fi rst time brought an international dispute before an 
international arbitration after only fi ve years of its existence, 
Japan had been a party to as many as four arbitration cases in 
the short span of twenty-fi ve years between 1877 and 1902. It is 
believed that this is a record which no other country of the 
period could equal. While each of these cases had a different 
background arising under different circumstances, it can safely 
be said that this is an evidence that shows the degree of 
positive attitude of esteem in which Japan held international 
law in those days.
The dispute in the Japanese House Tax case involved the 
interpretation and application of some provisions which came 
to be incorporated in the revised treaties of commerce and 
navigation that the Meiji Government had just succeeded in 
concluding with the former Treaty Powers after arduous 
protracted negotiations extending over 20 years (with 
Great Britain in 1894, and with France and Germany in 1896). 
The purpose of the revision had been to eliminate the elements 
of inequality contained in the old “unequal treaties” that had 
been imposed upon the Shogunate Government in the 1850s. 
The provisions in issue in the new revised treaties concerned 
the problem of abolition of the régime of extraterritoriality 
that had been granted under the old treaties to the resident 
nationals of the Treaty Powers with respect to taxation. The 
provisions in question, acknowledging the existing status quo 
in relation to the real property that had been leased in 
perpetuity to the foreigners under the old régime, stipulated 
that “existing leases in perpetuity under which real property is 
now held in the Settlements shall be confi rmed, and no 
conditions of any kind other than those contained in the 
existing leases shall be imposed in respect of such property”.
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The dispute arose when the Government of Japan claimed that 
under the new régime of the revised treaty the land only was 
exempt from the payment of imposts and other charges, and 
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sought to levy tax on the houses built on the land leased in 
perpetuity to these foreigners in the Settlements. Against this, 
the three Powers argued that by virtue of the provisions in the 
article in question, not only the land leased in perpetuity was 
exempt from the tax, but buildings constructed on such land, 
continued to enjoy the same exemption.
The Permanent Court of Arbitration, composed of three 
arbitrators from France, Japan and Norway, came out with an 
award in favour of the three European Powers. The decision 
was based primarily on a technical ground of law involving 
the interpretation of the provisions in question.
While this is not the proper place to engage in the detailed 
analysis of the arguments of both parties on the merits, the 
central issue in dispute would boil down to the following: 
Should the special régime of tax exemption for real property 
under the new revised treaties, recognized by the Meiji 
Government as lex specialis to the lex generalis under which 
the régime of extraterritoriality was abolished, apply only 
to the land in the foreign Settlements or also to the houses 
erected upon it? Thus formulated, the answer should be found 
through ascertaining the object and purpose of the new revised 
treaties, and the intention of the parties as seen from the 
natural and ordinary meaning of the provisions at issue.
The Court took an approach to look for the answer to the 
question put to it through in particular two elements: i.e., 
fi rst, the intention of the parties in creating this exemption at 
the time of the old treaties, and second, the subsequent 
practice of the parties during the period of the old treaties. 
The Court in its relevant parts of the award stated as follows:
“[I]n order to estimate the nature and extent of the 
engagements entered into on both sides by the lease in 
perpetuity, it is necessary to refer to various arrangements and 
Conventions arrived at between the Japanese authorities and 
the Representatives of various Powers, when the old 
Treaties were in force: From these instruments and from 
the stipulations inserted in the leases, it appears:
That foreigners not being permitted, according to the 
principles of Japanese law, to acquire ownership of land 
situated in that country, the Government have leased land 
to them in perpetuity;
That it was agreed in principle the foreign settlements 
should remain outside the municipal system of Japan . . .;
It would be easy to account for the care taken in drawing up 
the said instruments with a view of defi ning the obligations 
of every kind incumbent upon foreigners towards the Japanese 
Government, if it was understood that . . . they would, as lessees, 
only have to pay the imports and charges expressly mentioned 
in the said leases;
The land was leased for building purposes, which is 
indicated both by the situation of the ground and by the 
nature of the measures taken for its management by the 
Japanese Government;
It must be admitted that the circumstances thus recorded 
constitute arguments against the plea that this ground and 
buildings form entirely separate objects in the relations 
between the parties and from the fi scal point of view;
It is unquestionable that, in accordance with a practice which 
has not varied and which has existed for a long series of years, 
not only the land in question, but also the buildings erected 
on the land, have been exempt from all imports, taxes, charges, 
contributions or conditions whatsoever, other than those 
expressly stipulated in the leases in perpetuity;
The Government of Japan maintains . . . that this state of 
things, as well as the fi scal immunity enjoyed in general by 
foreigners in the country, was only due to the circumstances 
that the Consular Tribunals refused to give the necessary 
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sanction to the fi scal laws of the country;
However, this claim is devoid of proof, and it is not even 
alleged that the Japanese Government ever made reservations 
[on this point].”
 
In a nutshell, the Court held that the “unequal” favoured 
treatment of foreigners under the old Ansei Treaties continued 
to exist in relation both to the house tax and the land tax, on 
the ground inter alia, that the institution of tax exemption in 
the foreign Settlements under the old treaties was created with 
the intention of treating the Settlements separate from the 
municipal system of Japan and that it was not proven by the 
subsequent practices with regard to the régime of 
extraterritoriality that this arrangement under the old treaties 
was intended to apply only to the land but not to the buildings 
erected on it.
Whatever the cogency of the reasoning of the Court may be 
on legal grounds, it is easy to see how upset and disillusioned 
people in Japan were at this negative outcome of the award. 
This was so in particular because the nature of the dispute 
was directly related to the most emotional issue of the 
extraterritoriality régime contained in the “unequal treaties”. 
Their disappointment was all the greater because of their 
earlier conviction that the justice of the case was on their side. 
Indeed, they had not even dreamed of the possibility that their 
case could have been somehow fl awed from a purely legal 
point of view. Under such circumstances, the loss of that case 
by Japan had two major repercussions, both of which were 
going to exert an immeasurable impact on the subsequent 
course of Japan.
The fi rst is that the award kindled the suspicion that the West 
after all might not really be interested in treating Japan on a 
fair and equal footing basis as a member of the “community 
of civilized nations”. A further suspicion grew that the West 
might well bear some racial prejudice against Japan and might 
be working against the just interests of Japan.
The second signifi cant repercussion of this case, which to my 
mind is no less important, is that this experience taught a 
lesson to the Japanese - at least to those Japanese who were in a 
position to apply international law. The lesson they learnt was 
that international law was not so much a body of principles 
based on natural justice which the East could share in common 
with the West, as a bunch of technical rules to be manipulated. 
They might work to your advantage if you were suffi ciently 
skilful, or they might work to your disadvantage if you were 
not skilful. The disappointment and the disillusionment on 
the part of many at the loss of the case was proportionately 
the stronger because of their initial conviction in the justice 
of their case. There appeared a gradual but discernible trend 
towards an erosion in their faith in international law, which 
subsequently came to lead Japan into her tragic destiny.
The Encounter of Civilizations and Their Interaction
In the context of the history of contacts expanding over 
centuries, Europe and East Asia have shared a tumultuous past. 
However, the greatest historical evolution that changed the fate 
of a large part of East Asia, which has had until today a lasting 
imprint upon the relationship between Europe and East Asia 
came about in the form of colonial domination, to which 
many of the East Asian nations fell victim. Thus the 
Philippines became a colony of the Spaniards, Indonesia was 
also colonized by the Dutch, Malaya and Burma came under 
the British rule and Indochina fell under the French 
domination. China also became a target of colonial appetite. 
In this situation Japan also was exposed to the impact of this 
aggressive advance of European powers.
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The experience of Japan, nonetheless, was very different from 
those of many fellow East Asian nations. When in the latter 
half of the 19th century the real impact fell upon Japan with 
the demand for the opening of Japan to the world, Japan 
decided to engage in systematic efforts to turn this challenge 
into an opportunity, through her assiduous learning and 
digestion of things European, in order to assert her place 
within this “Community of Civilized Nations”. It is no doubt 
true that at a time when Japan was practically the only country 
outside Europe
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 to have been exposed to this process of 
admission into this community, it was unthinkable to those 
Japanese who handled this process to question and challenge 
the validity of the proposition that Japan could be part of the 
“Community of Civilized Nations” only through the process of 
assimilation to European civilization. In such an environment, 
it became imperative for Japan to pursue studies of European 
civilization and introduce it into her traditional social milieu. 
This conscious effort was carried out on a truly amazing scale in 
such wide-ranging fi elds as the system of government, economy, 
law, military affairs, and science and technology, and further 
extending to arts, literature, food, clothing and housing. In those 
days in Japan, the term “modernization” thus became 
synonymous with “Europeanization”. The footprints left by 
Europe in Japan during this period have indeed been indelible.
Nevertheless, I do not believe it is accurate to say that this 
“modern” Japan has been built entirely on the model of 
“Europeanization” in the sense of her total assimilation and 
integration into the orbit of European civilization. In fact, the 
process of “modernization” of Japan, at any rate in its 
civilizational sense, has been an unfi nished history of the 
intellectual struggle to reconcile and amalgamate the two 
seemingly different civilizations of the West and the East. 
Japan, instead of engaging in the “clash of civilizations”, has 
tried hard to assert her identity and her proper place within 
this “Community of Civilized Nations” through identifying 
something common and universal that she could accept as the 
basis of “modernization” of Japan in continuum with her past.
The process has not at all been easy; in fact, I do not claim that it 
has been a total success. As a famous professor of law at the 
Tokyo Imperial University of the Meiji period lamented, a 
serious concern was expressed that “with the coming into 
existence of the new Civil Code, the traditional virtues of loyalty 
to the sovereign (ch ) and piety to the parents (k ) would perish”.
This spiritual agony of the intellectuals of Japan has been even 
more dramatically articulated in the fi eld of literature - a 
domain of intellectual expression for the “Zeitgeist” of society 
A number of the most representative novelists of modern 
Japan have focussed their attention to the dilemma of “living 
with two civilizations” in the existential sense, as exemplifi ed 
by the works of Natsume Soseki, Tanisaki Junichiro, and 
Yokomitsu Riichi, to name only a few.
This intellectual struggle continues to this day in my view. In 
fact, I believe that one of the basic reasons why the process of 
globalization of today, as distinct from that of 
internationalization in the Meiji period of Japan, is so diffi cult 
lies precisely on this point. Globalization for Japan would 
involve not a quantitative change in society but a qualitative 
transformation of society.
Through the period of encounter of Japan with the West, 
when the Japanese intellectuals were confronted with a totally 
novel concept of “the law of nations” of the West, they tried 
hard to understand and grasp the concept by looking for a 
comparable frame of reference in their own cultural heritage 
and to identify this concept as one which should have its 
rational meaning in this context and should therefore 
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represent something common both to the East and the West.
While it may be true that this attempt on their part led them 
later into disillusionment and eventually into a blind alley 
which contributed to the subsequent course of history of 
Japan with tragic results, these Japanese élites who were 
engaged in the “modernization” of Japan proved to be highly 
intellectual and scientifi c in their approach. They tried to 
comprehend the meaning of what was “specifi c” by identifying 
what was “universal” in that specifi city. To borrow the words 
of Lévi-Strauss, a well-known social anthropologist of 
constructionist school, the scientifi c approach of structuralism 
in anthropology should consist in the “quest for the invariant, 
or for the invariant elements among the superfi cial differences”. 
What I am trying to say is that this approach of “the quest for 
the invariant elements among the superfi cial differences” 
represented the essence of the process of Japan’s encounter 
with the “Community of Civilized Nations”.
It is my submission that a true understanding of contemporary 
Japan, whether it is in its political, economic or social aspects, can 
only be complete and truthful on the basis of a comprehensive 
grasp of Japan in the context of such continuum in her history, 
her cultural heritage and her societal interaction expanding over 
centuries. To talk about the “enigma” of Japan as if there were 
something “enigmatic” or “intractable” about the contemporary 
Japan, applying the yardstick of one’s own cultural heritage, would 
be a superfi cial approach that could cloud one’s intellectual quest 
for “the invariant among the superfi cial differences”. In this brief 
presentation of mine today, I have tried to depict some of the 
essential points that I believe we have to bear in mind in our 
efforts to advance the cause of promoting Japanese studies at 
Leiden University, by using the historic episode of the reception
of the “law of nations” into Japan as their illustration.
Leiden University has been for the last few centuries the 
renowned centre of excellence for Japanese studies in Europe 
based on its holistic approach, solidly founded on its rich 
heritage of classical study of Japan. While specialized studies of 
contemporary Japan in her different facets are rapidly 
developing in this country and throughout Europe as the 
interaction between Japan and Europe is fast growing, I believe 
that it is this holistic approach to Japan as an organic whole as 
she exists in her historical and cultural contexts which 
constitutes the key to the success of this task.
I wish to close my remarks by quoting the classical wisdom of 
Confucius who said that “one can truly understand the new by 
going back to the basics of the old”. I believe that this should be 
the basis for genuine comprehension of various diverse facets 
of contemporary Japan with her diverse and often confusing 
manifestations.
Ik heb gezegd.
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